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Abstract—In this paper we present a novel model checking ap-
proach to finite-time safety verification of black-box continuous-
time dynamical systems within the framework of probably
approximately correct (PAC) learning. The black-box dynamical
systems are the ones, for which no model is given but whose
states changing continuously through time within a finite time
interval can be observed at some discrete time instants for a given
input. The new model checking approach is termed as PAC model
checking due to incorporation of learned models with correctness
guarantees expressed using the terms error probability and
confidence. Based on the error probability and confidence level,
our approach provides statistically formal guarantees that the
time-evolving trajectories of the black-box dynamical system
over finite time horizons fall within the range of the learned
model plus a bounded interval, contributing to insights on the
reachability of the black-box system and thus on the satisfiability
of its safety requirements. The learned model together with the
bounded interval is obtained by scenario optimization, which
boils down to a linear programming problem. Three examples
demonstrate the performance of our approach.
Index Terms—Black-box Dynamical Systems; PAC Model
Checking; Linear Programming.
I. INTRODUCTION
The complexity of today’s technological applications in-
duces a quest for automation, leading to many black-box
intelligent cyber-physical systems and thus being difficult to
reason about [25]. Many of these systems operate in safety-
critical context and hence safety-critical systems themselves
[32]. Therefore, reasonable performance guarantees should be
obtained before the systems are deployed.
Black-box checking, introduced by Peled at al. [31], is often
used for verifying non-stochastic black-box systems, based on
experiments that interface with them. It performs checks on
the system itself. The black-box checking is a combination
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of model checking and testing: model checking [12] checks
properties of a model of the system, but not the system itself.
In contrary, testing is usually applied to the actual system and
checks whether the system conforms with the model, further
serving to improve the model. They are two complementary
approaches for enhancing the reliability of black-box systems.
In the black-box checking, whenever a model is created, model
checking may reveal a fault in the system or show that the
model was not good enough and needs to be learned further
if the fault is spurious. If model checking does not reveal
a fault, equivalence between the model and the black-box
system is checked via testing. In case, non-equivalence is
detected, then the model needs to be further learned. The
checking-testing-learning repeated process is costly generally.
Recently, a method combining optimization-based falsification
and black-box checking was proposed to falsify specifications
for black-box cyber-physical systems in [40].
Another technique to verification of black-box systems is
statistical model checking (SMC) [35], [45]. SMC is pioneered
by Younes and Simmons in the discrete case in [47], which
is based on Sequential Probability Ratio Test [41]. It is a
compromise between verification and testing, which is based
on sampling executions of the system and then deciding
whether the samples provide a statistical evidence for the sat-
isfaction or violation of the specification based on hypothesis
testing [34]. SMC is now widely accepted in various research
areas such as software engineering, in particular for industrial
applications [13], or even for solving problems originating
from systems biology [11]. There are several reasons for this
success. First, SMC is very simple to understand, implement
and use. Second, it does not require extra modelling or
specification effort, but simply an executable system that
can be simulated and checked against state-based properties.
Third, it avoids the state space explosion in verification and
thus can be applied to analyze systems with large state
spaces. Consequently, there are variety of SMC tools such
as PLASMA-Lab [3], Ymer [46], VeStA [36], MRMC [24],
MC2 [20], UPPAAL-SMC [14] and so on. In order to further
improve the efficiency of SMC, Bayesian SMC was proposed
in [23], [48], which is a SMC based on Bayesian statistics.
The aforementioned SMC approaches for black-box systems
are free of mathematical models and perform checks on the
system itself by sampling executions of the system. However,
the usefulness of mathematical models is well documented.
The mathematical models not only help us to understand
the system, but also are instrumental to yield insight into
the complex processes involved in the system by extracting
the essential meaning of some hypotheses. Also, they allow
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2to study the effects of changes in their components and/or
environmental conditions on the system’s trajectories, i.e., they
allow the control and optimization of the system. Thus, the
introduction of mathematical models with appropriate degree
of complexity into SMC would contribute a lot to the analysis
of the black-box system, not only in the verification of its
specifications but also in understanding the complex mech-
anisms underlying and thus further optimizing the system.
Consequently, model learning based SMC approaches are also
proposed. For example, [1], [26]–[28] considered black-box
systems modelled by Markov decision processes and inferred
probabilistic models with the purpose of model checking. The
work in [29] combined stochastic learning and abstraction
with respect to some property for analyzing black-box systems
modelled by Markov decision processes. The work in [4]
presented an approach for black-box systems modelled by
Markov decision processes to unbounded reachability analysis
via SMC. The technique is based on delayed Q-learning, a
form of reinforcement learning. Generally, the exact learning
algorithms require checking equivalence between the model
and the system, which is difficult and undecidable. Regression
models were used in [17] for finding the regions in the
parameter space that lead to satisfaction or violation of given
specification with probabilistic coverage guarantees based on
conformal regression. Recently, learning procedure within the
PAC learning framework is proposed, e.g., [2], [10], [19], [30].
In this paper we propose a novel SMC approach for
finite-time safety verification of black-box continuous-time
dynamical systems within the framework of PAC learning
[18]. The black-box continuous-time dynamical systems are
the ones, for which no model is given but whose states
changing continuously through time over finite time horizons
can be observed at some discrete time instants for a given
input. The proposed new model checking, also termed as
PAC model checking, is built upon learned models within
the framework of PAC learning. In the PAC model checking,
correctness guarantees of the learned models are expressed
using the terms error probability and confidence level. We
show that the time-evolving trajectories of the black-box
system over a specified finite time horizon fall within the
range of the learned model plus a bounded interval with
statistical guarantees, which is further used to characterize the
satisfiability of safety requirements. Given an error probability
and a confidence level, which are two fundamental parameters
in PAC learning, the model together with the bounded interval
is computed via scenario optimization, which is widely used
for computing solutions to robust optimization problems based
on finite randomization of infinite constraints [5]. The scenario
optimization, which finally boils down to a linear program in
our approach, is constructed from a family of independent
and identically distributed datum collected by executing the
system. Three examples demonstrate the performance of our
approach. Our contributions are summarized as follows.
1). We propose a novel PAC model checking approach for
finite-time safety verification of black-box continuous-time
dynamical systems. In this approach the trajectories of the
black-box system over finite time horizons are shown to fall
within the range of a model plus a bounded interval with error
probabilities and confidence levels. This reachability analysis
is instrumental in characterizing the satisfiability of safety
requirements of the black-box system.
2). A linear programming based approach is proposed to
synthesize the model and the bounded interval. The size of the
linear programming problem could be independent of the one
of the black-box system, thus rendering our approach suitable
for large-scale systems.
Related Work
As mentioned above, there are many works on verifying
black-box systems. In this subsection we just discuss the
closely related works to the present one.
The works [2], [19] considered (unbounded) reachability
for Markov decision processes (and stochastic games in [2])
and inferred the transition probabilities with PAC guarantees.
The work [30] proposed an algorithm for constructing PAC
confidence sets for deep neural networks. The work in [43]
computed safe inputs for a black-box system such that the
system’s final outputs fall within a safe range with PAC
guarantees. In contrast, our approach focuses on analysis of
continuous-time systems, and infers that the time-evolving
trajectories of the black-box system over finite time horizons
fall within the range of a model plus a bounded interval with
PAC guarantees. The closest work in spirit to the present one
is [10], which considered verification of sequential programs
by learning models of the set of feasible paths of programs
within the framework of PAC learning. The model learning
algorithm in [10] is based on counterexample guided abstrac-
tion refinement. However, our approach considers continuous-
time systems and infers an approximation to the trajectories
of the system over the specified finite time horizon within the
framework of PAC learning, in which linear programs are used
for learning models.
In the framework of simulation-driven reachability analysis
[15], a PAC based method was proposed for learning discrep-
ancy functions in [16] for safety verification of hybrid systems
with black-box modules. The problem of learning discrepancy
functions is reduced to a problem of learning linear separators.
Although a PAC discrepancy function is computed in [16],
a characterization on how well the trajectories satisfy the
learned discrepancy function is not given and thus a formal
quantitative assessment on the satisfiability of safety properties
is not presented if a valid discrepancy function is not obtained.
Generally, valid discrepancy functions rather than PAC ones
for black-box systems are challenging to obtain. In contrast, a
formal characterization of the satisfiability of safety properties
is given based on the computation of PAC models in our PAC
model checking method.
When the continuous-time systems of interest are modeled
by ordinary differential equations or delay differential equa-
tions, and the equations are explicitly given, there are many
well-developed model-based reachability analysis techniques
over finite time horizons, e.g., Taylor-model method [9],
simulation-driven reachability method [15] and set-boundary
reachability method [44], for safety verification of these sys-
tems. However, our method focuses on black-box continuous-
time dynamical systems, whose mathematical abstractions are
3Fig. 1. An illustration of the system (1).
not acquired and which are only represented by a family of
datum. Such systems can not be handled by existing model-
based reachability analysis techniques.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In
Section II we formalize the concept of black-box continuous-
time dynamical systems and the problem of interest in this pa-
per. Section III elucidates our PAC model checking approach.
After demonstrating the performance of our approach on three
examples in Section IV, we conclude this paper in Section V.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this section we present the concept of black-box
continuous-time dynamical systems and the related problems,
as well as a brief introduction on scenario optimization. The
notations are used throughout this paper: R≥0 denotes the set
of nonnegative real values. R>0 denotes the set of positive real
values. Vectors are denoted by boldface letters. Besides, the
ground truth trajectories in all examples are obtained based
on the combination of Runge-Kutta simulation methods and
linear interpolation methods.
A. Problem Formulation
In this paper we consider a black-box continuous-time
dynamical system, whose dynamics are governed by a formula
of the following form:
y(t) = b(x0, t), (1)
where x0 = (x0,1, . . . , x0,n)> ∈ X0 is the input of the system,
the set X0 ⊆ Rn is compact, t ∈ [0, T ] with T ∈ R>0 is the
time variable, y(t) is the state of the system at time t, and
b(·, ·) : X0 × [0, T ] → R is the system mapping which is
unknown. Besides, we have the following assumptions.
Assumption 1. 1). The system (1) runs well, including the on-
board sensors, and thus it can provide us any family of finite
datum we need. Also, the provided datum are free of noise.
2). Suppose that the time horizon [0, T ] is endowed with
a σ−algebra Dt and a probability Pt over Dt is assigned.
Also, we assume that the set X0 of inputs is endowed with a
σ−algebra Dx0 and that a probability Px0 over Dx0 is as-
signed. Throughout this paper, we use the uniform distribution
Pt on [0, T ] and Px0 on X0 to illustrate our method, although
our method is not confined to this particular distribution.
The system (1) is illustrated in Fig. 1. Given an input
x0 ∈ X0, the trajectory of the system (1) with the input x0 is
denoted by yx0(·) : [0, T ]→ R.
Systems of the form (1) are all around us, especially
nowadays. For example, many AI systems such as robotics
and self-driving cars are leaving academic laboratories and
entering real-world applications. Unfortunately, many of these
systems can not explain their results even to their makers, let
alone to end-users [7]. They operate like black boxes, which
can be viewed in terms of a family of observed datum, without
any knowledge of their internal workings.
In this paper we propose a PAC model checking approach
for finite-time safety verification of the system (1). The safety
verification problem is widely studied in computer science,
e.g., [22]. In our approach, the key is to obtain a model with
appropriate degree of complexity, which is learned based on
a family of collected datum within the framework of PAC
learning and can characterize the system (1) with correctness
guarantees expressed with error probabilities and confidence
levels. For computing such models, we should address the
problems summarized below:
Problem 1. 1.1 What datum should we use?
1.2 How can we learn a mathematical model efficiently
based on the collected datum?
1.3 What is the discrepancy between the trajectories of the
learned mathematical model and the system (1)?
After computing the model, we will address the safety
verification problem below.
Problem 2. Given a set Uns ⊆ R of unsafe states, when the
trajectories of the computed model are shown to avoid the
set Uns, how can we formally characterize the satisfiability
of the safety property of avoiding the unsafe set Uns for the
black-box system (1) over the time horizon [0, T ]?
We in the sequel solve Problems 1 and 2 based on scenario
optimization.
Remark 1. Our method can be straightforwardly extended to
vector valued mappings of the form b(·, ·) : X0× [0, T ]→ Rq
with q > 1, but the scalar valued mappings b(·, ·) : X0 ×
[0, T ]→ R are considered for ease of exposition.
B. Scenario Optimization
This subsection gives a brief introduction on scenario opti-
mization. It provides statistical solutions to robust optimization
problems based on solving finite randomization of infinite
convex constraints.
A robust optimization problem of interest is as follows:
min
γ∈Γ⊆Rm
c>γ
s. t. fδ(γ) ≤ 0,∀δ ∈ ∆,
(2)
where fδ(γ) are continuous and convex functions over the
m−dimensional optimization variable γ for every δ ∈ ∆.
Also, the sets Γ and ∆ are convex and closed.
Generally, it is challenging to solve (2). The work in [5]
proposed a scenario optimization approach for solving (2) with
statistically formal guarantees.
Definition 1. Suppose that ∆ is endowed with a σ−algebra
D and that a probability P over D is assigned. The scenario
optimization of (2) is to obtain an approximate solution to (2)
via solving the convex program (3), which is constructed by
4extracting K independent and identically distributed samples
(δi)
K
i=1 from ∆ according to the probability distribution P:
min
γ∈Γ⊆Rm
c>γ
s. t. ∧Ki=1 fδi(γ) ≤ 0.
(3)
(3) relaxes (2) in that it only considers a finite subset of the
infinitely many constraints of (2). A mathematically rigorous
relation, which holds irrespective of the underlying probability
P, between the solutions of the two systems can be drawn [6].
Theorem 1. If (3) is feasible and attains a unique optimal
solution γ∗K , and
 ≥ 2
K
(ln
1
β
+m), (4)
where  ∈ (0, 1) and β ∈ (0, 1) are respectively a user-chosen
error level and confidence level, then with at least 1−β confi-
dence, γ∗K satisfies all constraints in ∆ but at most a fraction
of probability measure , i.e., P({δ ∈ ∆ | fδ(γ∗K)  0}) ≤ ,
where the confidence β is the K−fold probability PK in
∆K = ∆ × . . . ×∆, which is the set to which the extracted
sample (δ1, . . . , δK) belongs.
The above conclusion still holds if the uniqueness of optimal
solutions to (3) is removed [5], since a unique optimal solution
can always be obtained according to Tie-break rule if multiple
optimal solutions occur. Moreover, since β appears under the
sign of logarithm in (4), it can be made small, like 10−10 or
10−20, without increasing K significantly. Recently, scenario
optimization was used to compute probably approximately
safe inputs for a black-box system such that the system’s final
outputs fall within a safe range in [43], and perform safety
verification of hybrid systems in [42].
III. PAC MODEL CHECKING
In this paper we present our PAC model checking approach
for safety verification of the black-box system (1) by solving
Problems 1 and 2.
A. Datum Extraction
In this subsection we introduce what datum to use in
learning a model of the system (1) in our approach and how
to obtain them, i.e., solve Problem 1.1.
We first extract a family of independent and identically
distributed time instances (tj)Mj=1 from the time interval [0, T ]
according to the probability distribution Pt. Moreover, a family
of independent and identically distributed inputs (x0,i)Ni=1 is
also extracted from the set X0 according to the probability dis-
tribution Px0 . The process of obtaining (tj)
M
j=1 and (x0,i)
N
i=1
does not need to run or /simulate the system (1). The numbers
M and N rely on how accurate one wants the learned model
to achieve. The relationship is elucidated in Subsection III-B.
Next we need to run the system (1) to obtain its internal
datum. For each extracted input x0,i, i = 1, . . . , N , we
feed it to the system (1) and then run it until the time T .
In this process, the on-board sensors will help observe and
record the states of the system (1) at the time instance tj ,
j = 1, . . . ,M . This is realistic for some systems nowadays,
since smart sensors are taking over almost every sphere of
human life. For example, RADAR, LIDAR, GPS and computer
vision are widely used to work coherently for identifying the
position, velocity and other states of the vehicle. We denote
the family of observed states by (yi,j)i=1,...,N,j=1,...,M , where
yi,j denotes the state of the system (1) at time tj with the input
x0,i, i = 1, . . . , N , j = 1, . . . ,M.
So far, we obtain a family of datum(
(x0,i, tj , yi,j)
)i=1,...,N,
j=1,...,M
. Each data is a triple (x0, t, y(t)),
where x0 is the input of the system (1), t ∈ [0, T ] is the
time instance and y(t) is the state of the system (1) with the
input x0 at time t. The process of running the system (1)
can be regarded as a testing process. However, our method
goes further than testing techniques. We meanwhile collect a
family of datum and then use these datum to compute models
for characterizing the system (1) formally.
In our experiment, we assume that the input x0,i is noise-
free and the on-board sensors work perfectly such that the
observed datum are free of noise as well, i.e., yi,j is the exact
state of the system (1) with the input x0,i at time t = tj ,
i = 1, . . . , N , j = 1, . . . ,M. This assumption may be too
ideal in practice since input and sensor noise often exists. We
would relax it in our future work.
B. Safety Verification
In this section we elucidate our approach for solving Prob-
lems 1.2, 1.3 and 2 based on the family of datum obtained
from the process in Subsection III-A. We first consider the
system (1) with one trajectory, and then multiple trajectories
and finally all trajectories from the input set X0.
1) One Trajectory Verification: In this subsection, we solve
Problems 1.2, 1.3 and 2 for the system (1) with a single input.
Concretely, given a discrete-time trajectory of the system
(1) with the input x0,i, which is represented by a family
of datum
(
(x0,i, tj , yi,j)
)M
j=1
with (tj)Mj=1 and (yi,j)
M
j=1
obtained in Subsection III-A, we would compute a model
z(t) = w(x0,i, t) with w(x0,i, ·) : [0, T ] → R to characterize
yx0,i(·) : [0, T ]→ R.
PAC Models: In computing a model, we consider a linearly-
parameterized model template w(c1, . . . , ck,x0,i, t), k ≥ 1
such that w(c1, . . . , ck,x0,i, t) is for t ∈ [0, T ] a linear
function in c1, . . . , ck, which are unknown parameters. This
model can be a polynomial function over t, or a more
general nonlinear function over t. For instance, consider a two-
dimensional system with input state variable x = (x1, x2)>,
w(c1, c2,x, t) = c1x1t + c2x2t
2 is a linear function in c1
and c2, and w(c1, c2,x, t) = c1ex1x2t + c2 ln (x2t2) is also
a linear function over c1 and c2. Such models can be the
ones parameterized with orthonormal basis functions, which
are able to represent a set of physical systems [21]. For ease
of exposition, we use c to denote (cl)l=1,...,k in the reminder of
this paper. Generally, a model template of appropriate degree
of complexity should be chosen in order to avoid the over-
fitting issue and facilitate the reachability analysis. In practice,
5engineering insight and physical knowledge would facilitate
the selection of model templates.
Then we construct the following linear program over c for
computing a mathematical model based on the family of given
datum
(
(x0,i, tj , yi,j)
)M
j=1
:
min
c,ξ
ξ
s. t. for each j = 1, . . . ,M :
w(c,x0,i, tj)− b(x0,i, tj) ≤ ξ,
b(x0,i, tj)− w(c,x0,i, tj) ≤ ξ,
− Uc ≤ cl ≤ Uc, l = 1, . . . , k,
0 ≤ ξ ≤ Uξ,
(5)
which is equivalent to
min
c,ξ
ξ
s. t. for each j = 1, . . . ,M :
w(c,x0,i, tj)− yi,j ≤ ξ,
yi,j − w(c,x0,i, tj) ≤ ξ,
− Uc ≤ cl ≤ Uc, l = 1, . . . , k,
0 ≤ ξ ≤ Uξ,
(6)
where Uc ∈ R≥0 is a pre-specified upper bound for cl, l =
1, . . . , k, and Uξ ∈ R≥0 is a pre-specified upper bound for ξ.
Denote the optimal solution to (6) by (c∗, ξ∗). Thus, we
obtain a model z(t) = w(c∗,x0,i, t), whose discrepancy
with the system (1) is characterized by two approximation
parameters: error probability  ∈ (0, 1) and confidence level
β ∈ (0, 1). This is formally stated in Theorem 2.
Theorem 2. Let (c∗, ξ∗) be an optimal solution to (6),  ∈
(0, 1), β ∈ (0, 1) and
 ≥ 2
M
(ln
1
β
+ k + 1). (7)
Then we have that with at least 1− β confidence,
Pt
({
t ∈ [0, T ]
∣∣∣∣∣ |w(c∗,x0,i, t)− b(x0,i, t)| ≤ ξ∗
})
≥ 1−.
(8)
Proof. The conclusion is easily obtained by Theorem 1.
Actually, the computed mathematical model z(t) =
w(c∗,x0,i, t) is a PAC model [37], [38] with accuracy level 
and confidence level β. The accuracy parameter  in Theorem
2 determines how far the learned model can be from the
real one. This corresponds to the ”approximately correct”.
A confidence parameter β indicates how likely the learned
model is to meet that accuracy requirement. This corresponds
to the ”probably” part. Under the data access model that we
are investigating, these approximations are inevitable. Since
the training set
(
(x0,i, tj , yi,j)
)M
j=1
is randomly generated,
there may always be a small chance that it will happen to be
noninformative (for example, there is always some chance that
the training set will contain only one domain point, sampled
over and over again). Furthermore, even when we are lucky
Fig. 2. An illustration of the discrepancy between the mathematical model
z(t) = w(c∗,x0,i, t) and the system y(t) = b(x0,i, t) for t ∈ [0, T ].
enough to get a training sample that does faithfully represent
[0, T ], because it is just a finite sample, there may always be
some finite details of [0, T ] that it fails to reflect. The accuracy
parameter  allows forgiving the learned model for making
minor errors.
One Trajectory Verification: Based on Theorem 2, we
in this subsection solve Problem 2 for the system (1) with
one trajectory yx0,i(·) : [0, T ] → R using the trajectory
of the mathematical model z(t) = w(c∗,x0,i, t) within the
framework of PAC learning.
We first characterize the reachability of the trajectory
yx0,i(·) : [0, T ] → R using the mathematical model z(t) =
w(c∗,x0,i, t) plus the computed ξ∗. We denote the trajectory
of the mathematical model z(t) = w(c∗,x0,i, t) by zx0,i(·) :
[0, T ] → R. From Theorem 2, we have that with confidence
of at least 1− β,
yx0,i(t) ∈ [zx0,i(t)− ξ∗, zx0,i(t) + ξ∗] (9)
for all t in [0, T ] but at most a fraction of probability measure
, i.e., with confidence of at least 1 − β, the amount of time
for the trajectory yx0,i(·) : [0, T ] → R staying within the ξ∗
neighborhood of the trajectory zx0,i(·) : [0, T ] → R exceeds
T (1 − ). A graph explanation is further presented in Fig.
2 to enhance the understanding of (9). In Fig. 2, yx0,i(t) /∈
[zx0,i(t)− ξ∗, zx0,i(t) + ξ∗] for t ∈ [t1, t2] ∪ [t3, t4] ∪ [t5, t6].
According to Theorem 2, t6− t5 + t4− t3 + t2− t1 ≤ T with
confidence of at least 1− β.
Then we solve Problem 2 based on the formal reachability
characterization given above. That is,
if [zx0,i(t)− ξ∗, zx0,i(t) + ξ∗] does not intersect the unsafe
set Uns for t ∈ [0, T ], i. e., [zx0,i(t)−ξ∗, zx0,i(t)+ξ∗]∩Uns =
∅ for t ∈ [0, T ], we have that the amount of time the system
(1) with the input x0,i spends inside the unsafe set Uns does
not exceed T , with confidence of at least 1− β.
If β in Theorem 2 is extremely small (smaller than 10−20),
then we have a priori practical certainty that the total amount
of unsafe time does not exceed T . As explained in Sub-
section II-B, the confidence level 1 − β can be made large
without increasing the size M of samples significantly. This
framework is useful in those situations where the system (1)
is able to tolerate the exposure to a deteriorating agent for a
limited amount of time. For example, let us consider a solar-
powered autonomous vehicle. Regions without solar exposure
are considered to be unsafe, since the vehicle’s battery could be
drained after a period of time. However, it would be inefficient
to plan a path for the vehicle completely avoiding all these
6shaded regions. Instead, a more reasonable requirement would
be that the amount of time the vehicle spends in the shaded
regions is small.
Remark 2. Our approach can also be used to characterize
the case that there exists t ∈ [0, T ] such that [zx0,i(t) −
ξ∗, zx0,i(t)+ξ
∗]∩Uns 6= ∅. For this case, we need to compute
a value τ ≥ 0, which is larger than or equal to the amount of
time such that [zx0,i(t)−ξ∗, zx0,i(t)+ξ∗]∩Uns 6= ∅. Further,
we have that the amount of time the system (1) with the input
x0,i spends inside the unsafe set Uns does not exceed T + τ ,
with confidence of at least 1− β.
In the following we use an example from a Van-der-Pol
oscillator to enhance the understanding of our approach.
Example 1. Consider a system with T = 10, x0,i =
(1.4, 2.3)> and Uns = {y ∈ R | y ≥ 3}, whose internal
dynamics are described by an ordinary differential equation
which generally describes a Van-der-Pol oscillator [39]:{
dx1
dt = x2
dx2
dt = (1− x21)x2 − x1
. (10)
We assume that the trajectory of the system (1) in this
example describes the time evolution of the state x1 in (10),
i.e., y(t) = b(x0,i, t) = x1(t) for t ∈ [0, 10]. The ground
truth trajectory yx0,i(·) : [0, T ] → R, is illustrated in Fig. 3.
It is used to extract datum
(
(x0,i, tj , yi,j)
)M
j=1
and perform
comparisons. The method of constructing the ground truth
trajectory is introduced in the beginning of Section II.
Let β = 10−20 and  = 0.01. In this example we use M =
10811 and a polynomial w(c,x0,i, t) of degree 6 over t as
a mathematical model to perform computations. Since x0,i
is known, w(c,x0,i, t) is of the form
∑6
i=0 cit
i. Note that the
number k+1 of decision variables in (6) is 8 and consequently
M ≥ 10811 according to Theorem 2.
We obtain ξ∗ = 0.33 via solving the linear program (6) with
Uc = Uξ = 100. Therefore, we have that with confidence of
at least 1− 10−20,
yx0,i(t) ∈ [zx0,i(t)− 0.33, zx0,i(t) + 0.33] (11)
for all t in [0, 10] except at most a fraction of probability
measure 0.01, where zx0,i(·) : [0, T ] → R is the trajectory
of the mathematical model z(t) = w(c∗,x0,i, t). We also
take the time step ∆t = 10−5 and the corresponding states(
yx0,i(j∆t)
)106
j=0
on the ground truth trajectory to verify the
satisfiability of (11), i.e., whether yxi,0(j∆t) ∈ [zx0,i(j∆t)−
0.33, zx0,i(j∆t) + 0.33] holds for j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 106}. The
satisfiability ratio is 100%.
Since [zx0,i(t) − 0.33, zx0,i(t) + 0.33] ∩ Uns = ∅ for t ∈
[0, 10], we have that the amount of time the system (1) with
the input (1.4, 2.3)> spends inside the unsafe set Uns does
not exceed 0.1, with confidence of at least 1− 10−20.
2) Multiple Trajectories Verification: In Subsection 3.2.1
we considered one trajectory characterization of the system
(1). In this subsection we extend the method in Subsection
3.2.1 to multiple trajectories characterization. These trajecto-
ries are the ones of the system (1) with inputs x0,1, . . . ,x0,N .
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Fig. 3. An illustration of the trajectory reachability for Example 1. The green
curve denotes the ground truth trajectory. The red curve denotes zx0,i (·)+ξ∗ :
[0, 10]→ R and zx0,i (·)− ξ∗ : [0, 10]→ R respectively.
This extension is straightforward. We just need to enrich
the constraints in (6) by incorporating these discrete-time
trajectories
(
(x0,1, tj ,y1,j)
)M
j=1
, . . .,
(
(x0,N , tj ,yN,j)
)M
j=1
,
consequently resulting in the following linear program:
min
c,ξ
ξ
s. t. for each j = 1, . . . ,M and i = 1, . . . , N :
w(c,x0,i, tj)− yi,j ≤ ξ,
yi,j − w(c,x0,i, tj) ≤ ξ,
− Uc ≤ cl ≤ Uc, l = 1, . . . , k,
0 ≤ ξ ≤ Uξ,
(12)
where Uc ∈ R≥0 is a given upper bound for cl, l = 1, . . . , k,
and Uξ ∈ R≥0 is a given upper bound for ξ. Denote the
optimal solution to (12) by (c∗∗, ξ∗∗).
We denote the trajectory of the mathematical model z(t) =
w(c∗,x0, t) with the input x0 by zx0(·) : [0, T ] → R.
Similarly, we have the following theorem for the solution
obtained via solving the linear program (12).
Theorem 3. Let (c∗∗, ξ∗∗) be an optimal solution to (12),
 ∈ (0, 1), β ∈ (0, 1) and
 ≥ 2
M
(ln
1
β
+ k + 1). (13)
Then for each input x0,i, i = 1, . . . , N , we have that with at
least 1− β confidence,
Pt({t ∈ [0, T ] | |w(c∗∗,x0,i, t)− b(x0,i, t)| ≤ ξ∗∗}) ≥ 1− .
Proof. According to the scenario optimization in Subsection
II-B, we have that with at least 1− β confidence,
Pt({t ∈ [0, T ] | ∧Ni=1|w(c∗∗,x0,i, t)− b(x0,i, t)| ≤ ξ∗∗})
≥ 1− .
Since
Pt({t ∈ [0, T ] | |w(c∗∗,x0,i, t)− b(x0,i, t)| ≤ ξ∗∗}) ≥
Pt({t ∈ [0, T ] | ∧Mi=1|w(c∗∗,x0,i, t)− b(x0,i, t)| ≤ ξ∗∗})
for i ∈ {1, · · · ,M}, the conclusion follows directly.
From Theorem 3, we have that for each trajectory yx0,i(·) :
[0, T ]→ R of the system (1) with the input x0,i, i = 1, . . . , N ,
with confidence of at least 1− β,
yx0,i(t) ∈ [zx0,i(t)− ξ∗∗, zx0,i(t) + ξ∗∗]
7for all t in [0, T ] but at most a fraction of probability measure
, i.e., with confidence of at least 1 − β, each of the N
trajectories of the system (1) deviates from the corresponding
one of the mathematical model z(t) = w(c∗∗,x0, t) by at
most ξ∗∗ for all t ∈ [0, T ] but at most a fraction .
Consequently, the solution to Problem 2 for the system (1)
with multiple trajectories is presented below:
If [zx0,i(t)−ξ∗∗, zx0,i(t)+ξ∗∗] does not intersect the unsafe
set Uns for t ∈ [0, T ], i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, we have that the
amount of time the system (1) with the input x0,i spends inside
the unsafe set Uns does not exceed T , with confidence of at
least 1− β.
It is worth remarking that the family of inputs (x0,i)Ni=1
here does not require to be extracted independently according
to the probability distribution Px0 . They can be arbitrary N
inputs of interest in the set X0.
Example 2. Let’s take the system in Example 1 as an instance
to illustrate the case of two trajectories verification. These
two trajectories, which are presented in Fig. 4, respectively
describe the time evolution of the state x1 in (10) with two dif-
ferent inputs x0,1 = (1.25, 2.28)> and x0,2 = (1.55, 2.32)>.
Let β = 10−20 and  = 0.01. In this example we use
M = 26211 and a polynomial w(c,x0, t) of degree 6 as a
mathematical model, which is input-dependent and is linear
in c, to perform computations. The number k + 1 of decision
variables in (6) is 85 and thus M ≥ 26211 from Theorem 2.
We obtain ξ∗∗ = 0.34 via solving the linear program
(12) with Uc = Uξ = 100. Thus, for each i = 1, 2, we
have that with confidence of at least 1 − 10−20, yx0,i(t) ∈
[zx0,i(t)−0.34, zx0,i(t)+0.34] for all t ∈ [0, 10] except a small
fraction 0.01, where zx0,i(·) : [0, T ] → R is the trajectory of
the mathematical model z(t) = w(c∗∗,x0,i, t). Like Example
1, within the Monte-Carlo testing framework, we take the time
step ∆t = 10−5 and the corresponding states
(
yx0,i(j∆t)
)106
j=0
on the ground truth trajectory with the input x0,i to verify
whether yx0,i(j∆t) ∈ [zx0,i(j∆t) − 0.34, zx0,i(j∆t) + 0.34]
for j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 106}, where i = 1, 2. The satisfiability ratio
is 100% for both of these two trajectories.
Since [zx0,i(t) − 0.34, zx0,i(t) + 0.34] ∩ Uns = ∅ for t ∈
[0, 10] and i = 1, 2, we have that the amount of time the
system (1) with each of the two inputs x0,1 = (1.25, 2.28)>
and x0,2 = (1.55, 2.32)> spends inside the unsafe set Uns
does not exceed 0.1, with confidence of at least 1− 10−20.
3) All Trajectories Verification: In this subsection we fur-
ther extend the method in Subsection 3.2.2 for multiple trajec-
tories verification to all trajectories verification of the system
(1) with the input set X0. Unlike in Subsection 3.2.2, the
family of inputs (xi)Ni=1 in this situation should be extracted
independently according to the probability distribution Px0 .
Theorem 4. Let (c∗∗, ξ∗∗) be an optimal solution to (12),
1 ∈ (0, 1), β1 ∈ (0, 1), 2 ∈ (0, 1), β2 ∈ (0, 1), and
1 ≥ 2
M
(ln
1
β1
+ k + 1), (14)
2 ≥ 2
N
(ln
1
β2
+ k + 1). (15)
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Fig. 4. An illustration of two trajectories reachability for Example 2 with
inputs x0,1 = (1.25, 2.28)> and x0,2 = (1.55, 2.32)>. The green curves
denote the two ground truth trajectories. From middle to right (i = 1, 2): the
green curve denotes yx0,i (·) : [0, T ]→ R, and the red curves correspond to
zx0,i (·) + ξ∗∗ : [0, T ]→ R and zx0,i (·)− ξ∗∗ : [0, T ]→ R respectively.
Then we have that with at least 1−β2 confidence, Px0({x0 |
x0 ∈ X}) ≥ 1− 2, where X =x0 ∈ X0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
Pt
({
t ∈ [0, T ]
∣∣∣∣∣ |w(c∗∗,x0, t)− b(x0, t)|≤ ξ∗∗
})
≥ 1− 1,with confidence of at least 1− β1.
 .
Proof. Let us fix the time instances t1, · · · , tM firstly, we have
that with confidence of at least 1− β2,
Px0
(x0 ∈ X0
∣∣∣∣∣∣
M∧
j=1
|w(c∗∗,x0, tj)− b(x0, tj)| ≤ ξ∗∗

)
≥ 1− 2
Let X˜0 = {x0 ∈ X0 | ∧Mj=1|w(c∗∗,x0, tj) − b(x0, tj)| ≤
ξ∗∗}. Obviously, x0,i ∈ X˜0, i = 1, . . . , N . For x0 ∈ X˜0, we
can add the constraints involving x0 to the linear program (12)
and obtain the following linear program:
min
c,ξ
ξ
s. t. for each j = 1, . . . ,M and i = 1, . . . , N :
w(c,x0,i, tj)− yi,j ≤ ξ,
yi,j − w(c,x0,i, tj) ≤ ξ,
w(c,x0, tj)− b(x0, tj) ≤ ξ,
b(x0, tj)− w(c,x0, tj) ≤ ξ,
− Uc ≤ cl ≤ Uc, l = 1, . . . , k,
0 ≤ ξ ≤ Uξ.
(16)
Obviously, (c∗∗, ξ∗∗) is also an optimal solution to (16). Since
the time instances t1, · · · , tM are also extracted independently
8according to the distribution Pt, Theorem 3 indicates that with
confidence of at least 1− β1,
Pt({t ∈ [0, T ] | |w(c∗∗,x0, t)− b(x0, t)| ≤ ξ∗∗}) ≥ 1− 1
for x0 ∈ X˜0. Thus, we have X˜0 ⊆ X and consequently the
conclusion follows.
From Theorem 4, we have that with confidence of at least
1 − β2, the probability measure of the set X is larger than
1 − 2. The set X is a set of inputs such that the trajectory
of the system (1) with each of them does not deviate from
the corresponding one of the model z(t) = w(c∗∗, ·, ·) : Rn×
[0, T ]→ R by ξ∗∗ for all t ∈ [0, T ] but at most a fraction 1.
Thus, the solution to Problem 2 for the system (1) with all
trajectories originating from the set X0 is presented below:
If [zx0(t)− ξ∗∗, zx0(·) + ξ∗∗] ∩ Uns = ∅ for x0 ∈ X0 and
t ∈ [0, T ], we have that with confidence of at least 1−β2, the
probability measure of inputs in X0 such that the amount of
time the system (1) with each of them spends inside Uns does
not exceed 1T with confidence of at least 1 − β1, is larger
than 1− 2.
Although the size of the linear program (12) for computing
PAC models does not depend on the dimension of the system
(1), it heavily depends on 1, β1, 2, β2 and the number of
unknown parameters in a pre-specified PAC model template
according to inequalities (14) and (15) in Theorem 4.
Example 3. Let’s take the system in Example 1 again as an in-
stance to illustrate the case of all trajectories characterization.
The input set is assumed to be X0 = [1.25, 1.55]×[2.28, 2.32].
Let β1 = 10−10, 1 = 0.3, β2 = 10−10 and 2 = 0.5.
In this example we use M = 207, N = 125 and a
polynomial w(c, t) of degree 6 as a mathematical model,
which is input-independent and is linear in c, to perform
computations. The number k+ 1 of decision variables in (12)
is 8 and consequently M ≥ 207 and N ≥ 125 according
to Theorem 4. The computation time for solving the resulting
linear program is 150.32 seconds. The reason that an input-
independent model is used is to reduce the number of decision
variables in (12), which further results in reduction of the size
of extracted samples according to inequalities (14) and (15)
and thus reduction of the size of the linear program (12). These
computations were performed on an i7-7500U 2.70GHz CPU
with 32G RAM running Windows 10.
We obtain ξ∗∗ = 0.38 via solving the linear program (12)
with Uc = Uξ = 100. Therefore, with confidence of at least
1− 10−10, the probability measure of inputs in X0 such that
with confidence of at least 1− 10−10,
yx0(t) ∈ [zx0(t)− 0.38, zx0(t) + 0.38] (17)
for all t ∈ [0, 10] but at most a fraction 0.3, is larger than
0.5, where zx0(·) : [0, T ] → R is the trajectory of the
mathematical model z(t) = w(c∗∗, t). Within the Monte-Carlo
testing framework, we extract 104 inputs (x′i,0)
104
i=1 from X0
independently according to the probability distribution Px0
and then obtain their corresponding ground truth trajectories
for validating the above conclusion. Like Example 1, we take
the time step ∆t = 10−5 and the states
(
yx′0,i(j∆t)
)106
j=0
on
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Fig. 5. An illustration of all trajectories reachability for Example 3 with
X0 = [1.25, 1.55] × [2.28, 2.32]. The green curves denote the trajectories
generated by the extracted N inputs. The red curves denote w(c∗∗, ·)−ξ∗∗ :
[0, T ]→ R and w(c∗∗, ·) + ξ∗∗ : [0, T ]→ R respectively.
Fig. 6. An illustration of Monte Carlo validation for Example 3. The
green curves denote the extracted 104 trajectories, and the red curves denote
w(c∗∗, ·)+ξ∗∗ : [0, T ]→ R and w(c∗∗, ·)−ξ∗∗ : [0, T ]→ R respectively.
the ground truth trajectory with the input x′0,i to verify the
satisfiability of (17), where i = 1, . . . , 104. The satisfiability
ratio of 104 inputs such that
yx′0,i(j∆t) ∈ [zx′0,i(j∆t)− 0.38, zx′0,i(j∆t) + 0.38]
for all j ∈ {0, . . . , 106} but at most a fraction 0.05, is 100%.
Since [zx0(t)−ξ∗∗, zx0(·)+ξ∗∗]∩Uns = ∅ for x0 ∈ X0 and
t ∈ [0, 10], we have that with at least 1 − 10−10 confidence,
the probability measure of inputs in X0 such that the amount
of time the system (1) with each of them spends inside Uns
does not exceed 3 with at least 1−10−10 confidence, is larger
than 0.5.
IV. EXPERIMENTS
In this section we demonstrate the performance of our
approach on three examples. All computations were performed
on an i7-7500U 2.70GHz CPU with 32G RAM running
Windows 10.
Example 4. In this example we consider a black-box system
of the form (1) with T = 10, X0 = [1.0, 1.1]9 and Uns = {y ∈
R | y ≤ −3}, which describes the time evolution of the state
x1 in the following 9-dimensional biological model [8]:
x˙1(t) = 3x3(t)− x1(t)x6(t), x˙2(t) = x4(t)− x2(t)x6(t),
x˙3(t) = x1(t)x6(t)− 3x3(t), x˙4(t) = x2(t)x6(t)− x4(t),
x˙5(t) = 3x3(t) + 5x1(t)− x5(t),
x˙6(t) = 5x5(t) + 3x3(t) + x4(t)
− x6(t)(x1(t) + x2(t) + 2x8(t) + 1),
x˙7(t) = 5x4(t) + x2(t)− 0.5x7(t),
x˙8(t) = 5x7(t)− 2x6(t)x8(t) + x9(t)− 0.2x8(t),
x˙9(t) = 2x6(t)x8(t)− x9(t).
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Fig. 7. An illustration of trajectories reachability for Example 4 with the
polynomial PAC model of degree 2. The green curves denote the extracted
181 trajectories. The red curves denote w(c∗∗, ·) − ξ∗∗ : [0, T ] → R and
w(c∗∗, ·) + ξ∗∗ : [0, T ]→ R respectively.
Let 1 = 0.2, β1 = 10−10, 2 = 0.3 and β2 = 10−10. In
this example we compute two polynomial models of degree 2
and 5 to illustrate our method.
1). We use M = 271, N = 181 and a polynomial
w(c, t) of degree 2 as a mathematical model, which is input-
independent and is linear in c, to perform computations. Note
that the number k + 1 of decision variables in (12) is 4 and
consequently M ≥ 271 and N ≥ 181 according to Theorem
4. Via solving (12) with Uc = Uξ = 100 we obtain ξ∗∗ = 0.17.
The computation time is 167.43 seconds. Therefore, according
to Theorem 4, we conclude that with at least 1 − 10−10
confidence, the probability measure of inputs in X0 such that
with confidence of at least 1− 10−10,
yx0(t) ∈ [zx0(t)− 0.17, zx0(t) + 0.17]
for all t ∈ [0, 10] but at most a fraction 0.2, is larger than
0.7, where zx0(·) : [0, T ] → R is the trajectory of the model
z(t) = w(c∗∗, t). The reachability analysis is illustrated in
Fig. 7. Like Example 3, within the Monte-Carlo framework,
we also extract 104 inputs (x′i,0)
104
i=1 to verify the conclusion,
and obtain that the ratio of 104 inputs such that yx′i,0(j∆t) ∈
[zx′i,0(j∆t)−0.17, zx′i,0(j∆t)+0.17] for all j ∈ {0, . . . , 106}
but at most a fraction 0.05, is larger than 97.87%, where
∆t = 10−5.
Since [zx0(t)−0.17, zx0(t)+0.17]∩Uns = ∅ for t ∈ [0, 10]
and x0 ∈ X0, we have that with at least 1−10−10 confidence,
the probability measure of inputs in X0 such that the amount
of time the system (1) with each of them spends inside Uns
does not exceed 2 with confidence of at least 1 − 10−10, is
larger than 0.7.
2). We use M = 301, N = 201 and a polynomial
w(c, t) of degree 5 as a mathematical model, which is input-
independent and is linear in c, to perform computations. Note
that the number k + 1 of decision variables in (12) is 7 and
consequently M ≥ 301 and N ≥ 201 according to Theorem
4. Via solving (12) with Uc = Uξ = 100 we obtain ξ∗∗ = 0.12.
The computation time is 223.83 seconds. Therefore, according
to Theorem 4, we conclude that with at least 1 − 10−10
confidence, the probability measure of inputs in X0 such that
with confidence of at least 1− 10−10,
yx0(t) ∈ [zx0(t)− 0.12, zx0(t) + 0.12]
for all t ∈ [0, 10] but at most a fraction 0.2, is larger than
0.7, where zx0(·) : [0, T ] → R is the trajectory of the model
Fig. 8. An illustration of trajectories reachability for Example 4 with the
polynomial model of degree 5. The green curves denote the extracted 201
trajectories. The red curves denote w(c∗∗, ·) − ξ∗∗ : [0, T ] → R and
w(c∗∗, ·) + ξ∗∗ : [0, T ]→ R respectively.
Fig. 9. An illustration of Monte Carlo validation for Example 4. The
green curves denote the extracted 104 trajectories. The red curves denote
w(c∗∗, ·) + ξ∗∗ : [0, T ] → R and w(c∗∗, ·) − ξ∗∗ : [0, T ] → R
respectively, where w(c∗∗, ·) is the model of degree 5. The blue curves denote
w(c∗∗, ·)+ξ∗∗ : [0, T ]→ R and w(c∗∗, ·)−ξ∗∗ : [0, T ]→ R respectively,
where w(c∗∗, ·) is the model of degree 2.
z(t) = w(c∗∗, t). The reachability analysis is illustrated in
Fig. 8. Within the Monte-Carlo framework we use the 104
inputs (x′i,0)
104
i=1 in the first case to verify the conclusion, and
obtain that the ratio of 104 inputs such that yx′i,0(j∆t) ∈
[zx′i,0(j∆t)−0.12, zx′i,0(j∆t)+0.12] for all j ∈ {0, . . . , 106}
but at most a fraction 0.05, is larger than 98.56%, where
∆t = 10−5.
Similarly, due to the fact that [zx0(t)−0.12, zx0(t)+0.12]∩
Uns = ∅ for t ∈ [0, 10] and x0 ∈ X0, we have that with at
least 1− 10−10 confidence, the probability measure of inputs
in X0 such that the amount of time the system (1) with each
of them spends inside the unsafe set Uns does not exceed 2
with confidence of at least 1− 10−10, is larger than 0.7.
From the comparison results illustrated in Fig. 9 for the
above two cases with the same PAC guarantees, i.e., 1, 2,
β1 and β2 are the same, we observe that polynomial models
of higher degree could describe the internal dynamics of the
system (1) more exactly, but with more computation time.
Example 5. To demonstrate the applicability of our approach
to higher dimensional systems, we consider a scalable system
of the form (1) with T = 2, X0 = [0.5, 0.6]101 and Uns =
{y ∈ R | y ≥ 3.0}, describing the time evolution of the state
x1 in an ordinary differential equation [33]:
x˙1(t) = 1 +
1
l (
∑l
i=1 xi+1(t) + xi+2(t)),
x˙2(t) = x3(t), x˙3(t) = −10 sinx2(t)− x2(t)
. . .
x˙2l(t) = x2l+1(t), x˙2l+1(t) = −10 sinx2l(t)− x2(t)
where l = 50.
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Fig. 10. An illustration of all trajectories reachability for Example 5 with a
polynomial model of degree 2. The green curves denote the extracted 271
trajectories. The red curves denote w(c∗∗, ·) − ξ∗∗ : [0, T ] → R and
w(c∗∗, ·) + ξ∗∗ : [0, T ]→ R respectively.
Let 1 = 0.2, β1 = 10−10, 2 = 0.2 and β2 = 10−10. In
this example we compute two polynomial models of degree 2
and 4 to illustrate our method.
1). We use M = 271, N = 271 and a polynomial w(c, t) of
degree 2 as a mathematical model, which is input-independent,
to perform computations. Note that the number k + 1 of
decision variables in (12) is 4 and consequently M ≥ 271
and N ≥ 271 according to Theorem 4. Via solving (12) with
Uc = Uξ = 100, we obtain that ξ∗∗ = 0.36. The computation
time is 398.23 seconds. According to Theorem 4, we have that
with at least 1− 10−10 confidence, the probability measure of
inputs in X0 such that with confidence of at least 1− 10−10,
yx0(t) ∈ [zx0(t)− 0.36, zx0(t) + 0.36]
for all t ∈ [0, 2] but at most a fraction 0.2, is larger than 0.8,
where zx0(·) : [0, T ]→ R is the trajectory of the mathematical
model z(t) = w(c∗∗, t). The reachability analysis is illustrated
in Fig. 10. Like Example 4, within the Monte-Carlo testing
framework, we also extract 104 inputs (x′i,0)
104
i=1 to verify the
above conclusion, and obtain that the ratio of 104 inputs such
that yx′i,0(j∆t) ∈ [zx′i,0(j∆t)−0.36, zx′0(j∆t) + 0.36] for all
j ∈ {0, . . . , 105} is equal to 98.07%, where ∆t = 2105 and
i = 1, . . . , 104.
Since [zx0(t)− 0.36, zx0(t) + 0.36]∩ Uns = ∅ for t ∈ [0, 2]
and x0 ∈ X0, we have that with at least 1−10−10 confidence,
the probability measure of inputs in X0 such that the amount
of time the system (1) with each of them spends inside Uns
does not exceed 0.4 with at least 1 − 10−10 confidence, is
larger than 0.8.
2). We use M = 291, N = 291 and a polynomial w(c, t) of
degree 4 as a mathematical model, which is input-independent,
to perform computations. Note that the number k + 1 of
decision variables in (12) is 6 and consequently M ≥ 291
and N ≥ 291 according to Theorem 4. Via solving (12) with
Uc = Uξ = 100, we obtain that ξ∗∗ = 0.12. The computation
time is 398.23 seconds. According to Theorem 4, we have that
with at least 1− 10−10 confidence, the probability measure of
inputs in X0 such that with confidence of at least 1− 10−10,
yx0(t) ∈ [zx0(t)− 0.12, zx0(t) + 0.12]
for all t ∈ [0, 2] but at most a fraction 0.2, is larger than 0.8,
where zx0(·) : [0, T ]→ R is the trajectory of the mathematical
model z(t) = w(c∗∗, t). The reachability analysis is illustrated
in Fig. 11. Also, within the Monte-Carlo testing framework
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Fig. 11. An illustration of trajectories reachability for Example 5 with a
polynomial model of degree 4. The green curves denote the extracted 291
trajectories. The red curves denote w(c∗∗, ·) − ξ∗∗ : [0, T ] → R and
w(c∗∗, ·) + ξ∗∗ : [0, T ]→ R respectively.
Fig. 12. An illustration of Monte Carlo validation for Example 5. The green
curves denote the 104 trajectories. The red curves denote w(c∗∗, ·) + ξ∗∗ :
[0, T ]→ R and w(c∗∗, ·)− ξ∗∗ : [0, T ]→ R respectively, where w(c∗∗, ·)
is the PAC model of degree 4. The blue curves denote w(c∗∗, ·) + ξ∗∗ :
[0, T ]→ R and w(c∗∗, ·)− ξ∗∗ : [0, T ]→ R respectively, where w(c∗∗, ·)
is the PAC model of degree 2.
we use the 104 inputs (x′i,0)
104
i=1 in the first case to verify the
above conclusion, and obtain that the ratio of 104 inputs such
that yx′i,0(j∆t) ∈ [zx′i,0(j∆t) − 0.12, zx′0(j∆t) + 0.12] for
all j ∈ {0, . . . , 105} is equal to 1, where ∆t = 2105 and
i = 1, . . . , 104.
Similar to the first case, we have that with at least 1−10−10
confidence, the probability measure of inputs in X0 such that
the amount of time the system (1) with each of them spends
inside the unsafe set Uns does not exceed 0.4 with confidence
of at least 1− 10−10, is larger than 0.8.
Like Example 4, by comparing the results in Fig. 12 for the
above two cases with the same PAC guarantees, i.e., 1, 2, β1
and β2 are the same, we also obtain that polynomial models
of higher degree could capture the internal dynamics of the
system (1) more exactly, but with more computation time.
Example 6. In this example we show a strategy to overcome
the issue of solving large-scale linear programs based on
a black-box system of the form (1) which describes the
time evolution of the state x1 in the two-dimensional delay
differential equation x˙1(t) = ax1(t)(1−
x1(t)
m
) + bx1(t)x2(t)
x˙2(t) = cx2(t) + dx1(t− τ)x2(t− τ)
where τ = 0.1, a = 0.25, m = 200, b = −0.01, c = −1.00
and d = 0.01. The delay differential equation was a model for
predator-prey populations.
Assume that T = 10, the initial condition x(t) over t ∈
[−0.1, 0] is a constant vector falling within X0 = {(x1, x2) |
(x1 + 5)
2 + (x2 + 5)
2 ≤ 1} and Uns = {y | y ≥ 40}.
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Let 1 = 0.1, β1 = 10−10, 2 = 0.1 and β2 = 10−10. In
this example we first use input-dependent polynomial models
of degree 4 to illustrate this strategy, and then use input-
independent polynomial models of degree 4 to illustrate it.
1). Input-dependent Models: If a generic polynomial input-
dependent model template of degree 4, which is formed by
choosing all monomials of degree up to 4 as the basis poly-
nomials, is employed, the number k+ 1 of decision variables
in (12) is 36 and consequently M ≥ 1181 and N ≥ 1181
according to Theorem 4. This leads to a large-scale linear
program, producing heavy computational burden. As a result,
we did not obtain results within two hours via solving this
large-scale linear program.
Our strategy for avoiding large-scale linear programs is as
follows: a small family of datum is first employed to compute
an initial estimate of the coefficients c, and then determine
the values of some coefficients based on the computed c and
leave the remaining ones unknown, reducing the number of
decision variables in (12) and thus the size of the resulting
linear program.
In the experiment we first solve the linear program (12) with
M = 50 and N = 50 to obtain a model w′(c∗∗,x, t) with the
computation time of 1.82 seconds, and then use the computed
w′(c∗∗,x, t) to perform computations on the linear program
(12) with M = N = 481 and Uc = Uξ = 100. Note that the
number k + 1 of decision variables in (12) becomes 1 in this
setting and consequently M ≥ 481 and N ≥ 481 according to
Theorem 4. Via solving (12) with Uc = Uξ = 100, we obtain
that ξ∗∗ = 1.49 with the computation time of 268.67 seconds.
The reachability analysis is illustrated in Fig. 13. Therefore,
according to Theorem 4, we conclude that with at least 1 −
10−10 confidence, the probability measure of inputs in X0 such
that with confidence of at least 1− 10−10, yx0(t) ∈ [zx0(t)−
1.49, zx0(t)+1.49] for all t ∈ [0, 10] but at most a fraction 0.1,
is larger than 0.9, where zx0(·) : [0, T ]→ R is the trajectory
of the mathematical model z(t) = w′(c∗∗,x, t). Also, within
the Monte-Carlo framework, we extract 104 inputs (x′i,0)
104
i=1
to verify the above conclusion, and obtain that the ratio of 104
inputs such that yx′i,0(j∆t) ∈ [zx′i,0(j∆t)−1.49, zx′i,0(j∆t)+
1.49] for all j ∈ {0, . . . , 106} is 100%, where ∆t = 10−5.
Since [zx0(t)−1.49, zx0(t)+1.49]∩Uns = ∅ for t ∈ [0, 10]
and x0 ∈ X0, we have that with at least 1−10−10 confidence,
the probability measure of inputs in X0 such that the amount
of time the system (1) with each of them spends inside Uns
does not exceed 1 with confidence of at least 1 − 10−10, is
larger than 0.9.
2). Input-independent Models: If an input-independent poly-
nomial template of degree 4 is used to perform computations,
the number k + 1 of decision variables in (12) is 6 and
consequently M ≥ 581 and N ≥ 581 according to Theorem
4. Via solving the linear program (12) with M = N = 581
and Uc = Uξ = 100, we obtain ξ∗∗ = 24.84 with the com-
putation time of 6634.51 seconds. The reachability analysis is
illustrated in Fig. 14.
We also adopt the strategy presented in the above case
for reducing the computation cost. We first solve the linear
program (12) with M = N = 50 and Uc = Uξ = 100
to obtain a w′(c∗∗, t) with the computation time of 1.65
Fig. 13. An illustration of trajectories reachability for Example 6 with the
input-dependent model w′(c∗,x, t). The green curves denote some extracted
trajectories. The red curves denote the corresponding w′(c∗∗,x, ·) − ξ∗∗ :
[0, T ]→ R and w′(c∗∗,x, ·) + ξ∗∗ : [0, T ]→ R respectively.
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Fig. 14. An illustration of trajectories reachability for Example 6 with the
input-independent model w(c∗, t). The green curves denote some extracted
trajectories. The red curves denote the corresponding w(c∗∗, ·) − ξ∗∗ :
[0, T ]→ R and w(c∗∗, ·)+ξ∗∗ : [0, T ]→ R with ξ∗∗ = 24.84 respectively.
The blue curves denote the corresponding w′(c∗∗, ·)−ξ∗∗ : [0, T ]→ R and
w′(c∗∗, ·) + ξ∗∗ : [0, T ]→ R with ξ∗∗ = 25.96 respectively.
seconds, and then use the computed w′(c∗∗, t) to perform
computations on the linear program (12) with M = N = 481
and Uc = Uξ = 100. Note that the number k + 1 of decision
variables in (12) becomes 1 in this setting and consequently
M ≥ 481 and N ≥ 481 according to Theorem 4. Via solving
(12) with Uc = Uξ = 100, we obtain that ξ∗∗ = 25.96
with the computation time of 71.09 seconds. The reachability
analysis is illustrated in Fig. 14 as well. The safety guarantee
is the same with the case of using input-dependent models.
Similarly, within the Monte-Carlo framework, we use the
104 inputs (x′i,0)
104
i=1 in the first case to verify the above
conclusion, and obtain that the ratio of 104 inputs such that
yx′i,0(j∆t) ∈ [zx′i,0(j∆t)− 25.96, zx′i,0(j∆t) + 25.96] for all
j ∈ {0, . . . , 106} is equal to 100%, where ∆t = 10−5.
Via comparing the results in Fig. 13 and 14 for the above
two cases with the same PAC guarantees, i.e., 1, 2, β1 and
β2 are the same, we conclude that input-dependent polynomial
models could capture the internal dynamics of the system (1)
more exactly than input-independent ones, but also with more
computation cost.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper we proposed a novel PAC model check-
ing approach for finite-time safety verification of black-box
continuous-time dynamical systems, which are represented by
observed datum, within the framework of PAC learning. In
this approach, a PAC model of the system was computed such
that the time-evolving trajectories of the black-box dynamical
system over finite-time horizons fall within the range of the
PAC model plus a bounded interval with error probabilities and
confidence levels, thus facilitating the formal characterization
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of the satisfiability of safety requirements. Both the PAC model
and the bounded interval were obtained via scenario opti-
mization, which finally boil down to a linear program. Three
examples demonstrated the performance of our approach.
In the future we would extend our method to safety ver-
ification of black-box systems, whose internal mechanisms
are described by hybrid dynamical systems that exhibit both
continuous and discrete dynamic behavior. Also, we would
like to extend our method for safety verification of black-box
systems with noise measurements and inputs.
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